Optimizing targeted vaccination across cyber-physical networks: an empirically based mathematical simulation study by Mones, Enys et al.
 
 
General rights 
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright 
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. 
 
 Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. 
 You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain 
 You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal 
 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately 
and investigate your claim. 
  
 
   
 
 
Downloaded from orbit.dtu.dk on: Oct 26, 2019
Optimizing targeted vaccination across cyber-physical networks: an empirically based
mathematical simulation study
Mones, Enys; Stopczynski, Arkadiusz; Pentland, Alex 'Sandy'; Hupert, Nathaniel; Lehmann, Sune
Published in:
Journal of the Royal Society. Interface
Link to article, DOI:
10.1098/rsif.2017.0783
Publication date:
2018
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link back to DTU Orbit
Citation (APA):
Mones, E., Stopczynski, A., Pentland, A. S., Hupert, N., & Lehmann, S. (2018). Optimizing targeted vaccination
across cyber-physical networks: an empirically based mathematical simulation study. Journal of the Royal
Society. Interface, 15(138), [20170783]. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2017.0783
 on January 10, 2018http://rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from rsif.royalsocietypublishing.orgResearchCite this article: Mones E, Stopczynski A,
Pentland AS, Hupert N, Lehmann S. 2018
Optimizing targeted vaccination across cyber–
physical networks: an empirically based
mathematical simulation study. J. R. Soc.
Interface 15: 20170783.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2017.0783Received: 20 October 2017
Accepted: 1 December 2017Subject Category:
Life Sciences–Physics interface
Subject Areas:
computational biology, medical physics
Keywords:
epidemiology, vaccination,
disease transmission, digital networks,
social networks, physical proximityAuthor for correspondence:
Sune Lehmann
e-mail: sljo@dtu.dkElectronic supplementary material is available
online at https://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.
figshare.c.3950776.& 2018 The Author(s) Published by the Royal Society. All rights reserved.Optimizing targeted vaccination across
cyber–physical networks: an empirically
based mathematical simulation study
Enys Mones1, Arkadiusz Stopczynski1,2, Alex ‘Sandy’ Pentland2,
Nathaniel Hupert3 and Sune Lehmann1,4
1Department of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science, Technical University of Denmark,
Kongens Lyngby, Denmark
2Media Lab, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA
3Weill Cornell Medical College, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA
4The Niels Bohr Institute, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark
EM, 0000-0001-7724-0094
Targeted vaccination, whether to minimize the forward transmission of infec-
tious diseases or their clinical impact, is one of the ‘holy grails’ of modern
infectious disease outbreak response, yet it is difficult to achieve in practice
due to the challenge of identifying optimal targets in real time. If interruption
of disease transmission is the goal, targeting requires knowledge of underlying
person-to-person contact networks. Digital communication networks may
reflect not only virtual but also physical interactions that could result in disease
transmission, but the precise overlap between these cyber and physical
networks has never been empirically explored in real-life settings. Here, we
study the digital communication activity of more than 500 individuals along
with their person-to-person contacts at a 5-min temporal resolution. We then
simulate different disease transmission scenarios on the person-to-person
physical contact network to determine whether cyber communication net-
works can be harnessed to advance the goal of targeted vaccination for a
disease spreading on the networkof physical proximity.We show that individ-
uals selected on the basis of their closeness centrality within cyber networks
(whatwe call ‘cyber-directed vaccination’) can enhance vaccination campaigns
against diseases with short-range (but not full-range) modes of transmission.1. Introduction
Strategies for countering infectious diseases have been actively developed in recent
years [1], the twomost prominent methods being monitoring and vaccination [2–
8]. In the case ofmonitoring, the goal is to forecast an outbreak byobserving only a
small, high-risk subpopulation that is expected to become infected at an early stage
of an outbreak. The goal of vaccination is to reduce the effective size of the suscep-
tible population below a threshold in order achieve ‘herd immunity’ [9]. From a
network perspective, we approach herd immunity by decreasing the number of
links between susceptible individuals in a population, across which the disease
may be transmitted [8]. While full knowledge of the outbreak state (in the case of
monitoring) or full populationprotection (in the case of vaccination) are preferable,
neither is practically feasible [10,11]. For this reason, targeted strategies that involve
interventions focused on a small, carefully selected subpopulation are of major
interest [7,10,12–17]. It has been shown that densely connected populations,
such as schools [18,19], universities [10] or hospitals [20], play a significant role
in large outbreaks [21], offering numerous paths for diseases to propagate. Such
cohesive communitiesmayalso serve as ‘living laboratories’ for studying the struc-
ture of interpersonal networks, making them especially interesting in the
advancement of epidemiological control efforts. For diseases with person-to-
person transmission, direct identification of optimal target groups requires knowl-
edgeof the structureof thephysical contactnetwork, collectionofwhich isusuallya
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feasibility of this approach. Communication networks, such as
online social networksorcall detail records (CDRs)mayprovide
an accessible proxy of the structure of contacts among individ-
uals, and immunization strategies that take advantage of the
structure of these networks have been suggested [8]. However,
due to the known topological differences between communi-
cation networks and networks of person-to-person proximity
contacts [18,23–25], the role of digital communication networks
in locating epidemiologically relevant target individuals
remains largely unknown [25]. This study addresses this
digital–physical divide: we ask whether it is possible to extract
information solely from individuals’ cyber networks (in this
case, Facebook and phone call networks) in order to alter pat-
terns of disease spread across the corresponding network of
physical interactions between those same individuals.
Our study focuses on a densely connected population of
532 university students whose physical and cyber data make
up the Copenhagen Network (CN) Study, which includes
records of Facebook friendships, Facebook activity/feeds,
CDRs and Bluetooth scans to measure person-to-person
contacts, collected with high temporal resolution over 2 years
(details of the measurement are provided in Material and
methods). By simulating outbreaks of diseases with different
transmission characteristics over the physical component of
this empirical network, we are able to gauge the effectiveness
of mining digital communication network data to guide
targeted outbreak vaccination strategies. We compare our tar-
geted results to both random immunization (RI) (which we
predict would yield poor outcomes) and a theoretically near-
optimal colocation strategy (CS) [5], whereby individuals in
closest actual physical proximity to infected individuals are
somehow identified and targeted for vaccine administration.
We will henceforth refer to CS as optimal, based on previous
results by Smieszek & Salathe´ [5], indicating that this strategy
displays equivalent performance to that of an optimal target
group found by brute-force optimization. Unfortunately, CS is
logistically infeasible in a realistic setting, since public health
officials do not have access to the type of physical proximity
data collected here. This study therefore explores, for the first
time, whether a group of individuals’ digital records can be
used to robustly approximate characteristics of their physical
proximity networks. In particular, we study whether targeted
interventions based on these digital networks, allow us to
approximate an optimal vaccination strategy, which can only
be derived from the physical proximity network.2. Material and methods
2.1. Data collection
The CN Study collected physical proximity (by recording
Bluetooth scans), CDRs, Facebook friendship and Facebook feed
data between 2012 and 2014 for 532 students at the Danish Techni-
cal University who volunteered to participate in the study [23].
Data collection was performed using Nexus smartphones with a
pre-installed data collector application, which were handed out
to students, with subsequent data collection on multiple channels:
location, Wi-Fi scans, Facebook feed, CDRs and Bluetooth scans
with a temporal resolution of 5min. The original study was
based on data from 1000 smartphones, but here we consider data
from the 532 participants with a data quality of at least 60% in
the period of interest (based on availability of proximity data;
see electronic supplementary material, §S1 for details on dataquality). Results reported in this paper correspond to the period
of February 2014, which is located in the beginning of the students’
second semester and is representative of typical contact patterns
(no exams, vacations, etc.). See electronic supplementary material,
§S1 for the details of data collection and data filtering.
2.2. Contact and communication networks
We constructed three networks from the data collected during
the CN Study: physical proximity networks, cellphone calls and
Facebook interactions. Bluetooth scans were used to construct the
temporal proximity networks in two ways: the scan list data pro-
vided all interactions in a full-range (up to 10–15m) that are the
basis for the simulations on full-range disease spread (we refer to
this network as the full-rangeproximity network). By restricting con-
tacts to signal strengths of RSSI.275 dBm, the short-range network
(range up to 1m) was obtained (short-range proximity network)
[26]. The full-range and short-range networks provide rough
approximations for airborne (e.g. measles) and droplet (e.g. influ-
enza) modes of pathogen transmission, respectively [27–29]. It
should be noted that the threshold of275 dBm is highly conserva-
tive in order to reduce the likelihood of observing false positives,
therefore the typical distance between pairs of individuals in the
short-range network is below 1m. Each link represents at least one
observation of a contact between two individuals within a 5min
timebin. Inotherwords, if there is a link inany5minbin throughout
the period of interest, we add a 5min link to the simulation extend-
ing an (possibly shorter) interaction to 5min. The temporal
resolution of 5min has been shown to capture the key dynamics
of person-to-person networks [18,30]. We stress that while sensor-
based proximity networks are a highly useful model to assess the
impact of immunizations strategies, they suffer from important
limitations [31–33]; see Discussion for details. Digital communi-
cation networks were constructed separately for CDR and records
of Facebook activity. These networks describe the communication
between theparticipantsviaphonecallsor interactionsonFacebook,
respectively, andwere aggregated over the period of interest, result-
ing in undirected static graphs (i.e. not recordingwho calledwhom).
Properties of all networks are illustrated in figure 1.
2.3. Epidemiological model
After assessing a variety of network metrics, we chose to use
closeness centrality (i.e. the average distance of a node to all
other nodes following contacts in the network) as the criterion
for targeting vaccination (see Network Measures for definitions
and electronic supplementary material, §S1.3 and §S4.1 for
more details on the various selection methods). As we are inter-
ested in the dynamics of a single unfolding epidemic event, we
focus on epidemics without an endemic state. Index cases are
chosen randomly with uniform distribution over the initially sus-
ceptible population (those not vaccinated). All data are the result
of the statistics calculated over an ensemble of at least 1000 simu-
lations with varying initial conditions, that is, a randomly chosen
index case population. To evaluate the efficacy of vaccination
focusing on specific target groups, we measure the relative out-
break size during susceptible–infectious–recovered (SIR)
epidemics simulated on both the short- and full-range proximity
networks. The relative outbreak size is the number of infected
individuals divided by the size of the initial susceptible popu-
lation, and therefore accounts only for the network effect (see
electronic supplementary material for details). In our model, vac-
cination is assumed to provide full immunity with no side effects
and we study the extent to which vaccination reduces the final
outbreak size. Epidemic parameters were chosen to be consistent
with expected infectious periods (3–4 days) and basic reproduc-
tion numbers (2 , R0 , 3) of real-world infectious diseases such
as influenza [34]. We simulated the dynamics of the short- and
full-range diseases using a classic form of the SIR model with
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Figure 1. Characteristics of the person-to-person and communication networks. (a) Average degree (kkl) of the networks, normalized by the maximum of each
trend. Curves show weekly trends averaged over four months. Snapshots correspond to 4 h aggregated networks; last column shows the entire networks. Individuals
belonging to the same communities are grouped together. (b) Degree distribution of the person-to-person networks; inset shows the cumulative distribution.
(c) Degree distribution of the communication networks; inset shows the cumulative distribution. (d ) Fraction of the giant component (S) reached in an invasive
percolation process. Black dashed lines are guidance for the slopes. (e) Size of the giant component (GC) after the removal of fedge fraction of the strongest links.
Dashed lines indicate the percolation threshold of the configuration model with the same average number of first and second neighbours.
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model is intentionally simplistic, intended to illustrate the
structural effects of vaccination in terms of a full-range versus a
short-range transmission, rather than emulate a specific disease.
The probability of infection per contact event and expected infec-
tious period at each time step are bfull¼ 0.002, Tfull ¼ 3 days and
bshort ¼ 0.01, Tshort ¼ 4 days for the full- and short-range proxi-
mity networks, respectively. The infection probabilities above
correspond to physical rates of infection of bfullphys ¼ 0.717 day21
and bshortphys ¼ 0.591 day21, and the basic reproduction numbers of
Rfull0 ¼ 2.151 and Rshort0 ¼ 2.364, which is within the range of R0
for influenza [7]. More details on the parameter adjustment, analy-
sis and the behaviour of SIR dynamics on the proximity networks
are presented in electronic supplementary material, §S2.
2.4. Network measures
We use three basic network properties to summarize the struc-
ture of the different networks: the average number of contacts
(average degree), average fraction of connected neighbours (average
clustering coefficient) and the average number of steps between all
pairs of nodes (average path length). Target groups of size n are
obtained from the digital communication networks by ranking
individuals in the aggregated graphs by their closeness centrality,
defined by
C(i)C ¼
N  1P
i=j dij
, ð2:1Þwhere N is the number of nodes in the graph and dij denotes the
distance between nodes i and j, i.e. the lowest number of steps to
reach node j from node i. If the graph is not connected, we set
dij ¼ N for nodes that are separated. After ranking individuals
according to CC, we select the ones with the highest centrality
to obtain a group of desired size. In the case of colocation-
based target groups, individuals are ranked based on their
total time spent in the proximity of others, that is
wi ¼
X
j,t
gijt, ð2:2Þ
where gijt ¼ 1 if participants i and j have been in close proximity
at time t, and zero otherwise. Ranking all members by their
weight, we select the ones with the largest value to include in
the target groups, following the strategy of Smieszek & Salathe´
[5]. Strategies based on other centrality measures as well as the
details of the selection are discussed in more details in electronic
supplementary material, §S1.3 and §S4.
Vaccination efficiency based on communication network
target groups is compared to immunization strategies based on
RI and a near-optimal CS set of targets. During random selection,
a number of individuals are chosen randomly from the population,
providing a lower bound for intervention performance; conver-
sely, colocation target groups include individuals with the
highest fraction of time spent in proximity of others. Colocation-
based target groups establish an approximate upper bound for
intervention performance [5]. They rely on full knowledge of the
Table 1. Static properties of the person-to-person and digital
communication networks. Basic network characteristics are reported for the
static aggregated networks: number of diads (E), average degree (kkl),
average clustering (C ) and average path length (‘). For deﬁnitions, see
Material and methods.
network E kkl C ‘
full-range
proximity
69 055 259.6 0.644 1.53
short-range
proximity
20 690 77.78 0.356 1.91
Facebook 1 261 4.741 0.150 3.87
call 354 1.331 0.102 7.03
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optimal, as they do not consider temporal dynamics.33. Results
Basic structural characteristics of the static aggregated networks
are shown in table 1 and figure 1.The figure shows theaverage of
16 weeks of data, whereas each circular network (figure 1b) cor-
responds to an aggregate of 4 h sampled from the first week.
Statistics (figure 1c– f) are based on four months of data.
While activity in all four networks (full- and short-range proxi-
mity, Facebook and call networks) follows distinct daily
schedules and rhythms, digital channels show strong bursts of
activity outside of work periods: lunch breaks, evenings and
weekends (figure 1a). Individuals that are highly connected
are drawn next to each other in the layout (dense group of
nodes in the plot). Note that some of the links between these
densely connected parts of the population are represented by
all channels, whereas some communication is only present in
the cyber (telephone and online) communication networks.
Both short-and full-range networks of physical proximity fea-
ture more than 10-fold higher edge density compared to these
cyber networks (figure 1b,c, and reflected in the reciprocal
relationship between average degree k and average path length
l of these networks listed in table 1); this means, colloquially,
that the studysubjects hadmore contact via physical interactions
and they spentmore timewith their friends in real life than they
did electronically. The degree distributions of the person-to-
personnetworksare consistentwith anapproximate normaldis-
tribution, whereas those of the communication networks follow
a power-law distribution, supported by both the Akaike
information criterion and Kolmogorov–Smirnov goodness-of-
fit-basedmodel selection (confirming earlier published findings
on proximity networks) [18,23].
The proximity networks contain a large number of links (of
the order of 105–106 across the observation period), revealing a
highly dynamic set of real-world physical contacts, in contrast
with the relatively sparser corresponding cyber networks.
Figure 1d shows how these differences are reflected in the
time respecting network connectivity, that is, when the tem-
porality of the links is taken into consideration. The majority
of nodes in the physical networks can be reached in a relatively
short time—over 40% in a day and over 95% in under aweek—
in contrast with the digital networkswhich requiremore than amonth to be fully explored, as quantified by an invasion perco-
lation process with transmission probability 1, i.e. a process
that propagates from node to node across every edge of the
network without fail. Curves show the average of 1000 realiz-
ations over random initial conditions. When compared with
the full-range network, the short-range network includes
only the most frequent contacts, as suggested by the slope of
the invasion curve: after a transient delay in the invasion
level (approx. 10 h), a majority of the giant components in
the short-range network can be explored in a shorter time,
meaning that most of the links describe frequent contacts in
that network (black dashed lines are included to highlight
the slopes of the short- and full-range contact networks). The
robustness of the aggregated networks is illustrated by the
change in the size of their giant component (i.e. the largest con-
nected component in a graph) after the removal of a random set
of links, as shown in figure 1e. The giant component is the lar-
gest connected set of nodes in the network. An invasion curve
represents the number of nodes that are infected during an
invasion process, divided by the size of the giant component.
An invasion process is a susceptible–infected model with an
infection rate of 1.
Figure 2a depicts the median infection time restricted to
the target vaccination groups (i.e. individuals selected on
the basis of their closeness centrality within the digital com-
munication networks, hereafter referred to as the ‘cyber-
directed vaccination’ group) compared to randomly selected
(RI) and colocation-based strategy (CS) vaccination groups.
All curves are the median of 10 000 simulations. As a measure
of performance, we use corrected time of infection [5]. The cor-
rected time of infection is defined as ti ¼ ti/pi, where ti is the
average time of infection and pi is the probability of infection
for user i. The correction by the probability of infection
ensures that individuals of high vulnerability (those who
are more exposed to the disease) are weighted higher in the
monitoring scenario where the goal is to detect the outbreak
at the earliest possible time with high probability. On aver-
age, individuals selected based solely on the basis of their
digital records become infected significantly earlier (24%
and 18% earlier than the population average, corresponding
to 3 and 2 days) for both short- and full-range networks,
results that are only 14% and 19% worse on average than
the hypothetically optimal CS, respectively. As shown in
electronic supplementary material, §S3, these hypothetical
gold-standard colocation-based groups also become infected
significantly earlier [5,10]. Also note that—in contrast with
the full-range network—for the short-range interactions, the
corrected time among the cyber-directed target individuals
does not differ significantly from the optimal time.
To assess the efficacy of cyber-directed vaccination, we
measured the relative outbreak size in the presence of the
immunized target group; that is, the total number of infections
(I1) divided by the initial number of susceptible individuals
(S0): irel ¼ I1/S0, excluding the vaccinated subpopulation
from the calculation, and thus measuring only the network
effect. In figure 2b, the median relative outbreak sizes are
plotted against the fraction of the population immunized.
Results are calculated over 1000 simulations with minimum
outbreak sizes of 5% among the initial susceptible population.
The hypothetical optimal colocation vaccination strategy (CS)
reduces outbreak size by more than 80% after the immuniz-
ation of 20% and 30% of the network in short- and full-range
transmission, respectively (relative to the unvaccinated
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Figure 2. Vaccination effectiveness and outbreak dynamics. (a) Median cor-
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denote lower and upper quartiles. (b) Relative outbreak size under different
immunization strategies for diseases with short-range (top) and full-range
(bottom) transmission. Error bands mark the lower and upper quartiles.
Insets show the mode of the distributions over all realizations. Outbreak
size distributions p(i) are shown for target groups of 50, 150 and 250 indi-
viduals; in the case of short range in subfigures (i)– (iii) and for full range in
subfigures (iv)– (vi). The size of the target groups is indicated for each
distribution.
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proposed cyber-directed vaccination strategy, achieving a simi-
lar 80%outbreak size reductionwould require vaccinating 32%
and 50% of the network in short- and full-range transmission,respectively. For diseases spreading via short-range inter-
actions, cyber-based strategies are effective and outperform
RI even for small target groups, approaching the performance
of the CS once more than 20% of the population has been vac-
cinated. If the disease transmission occurs on the full-range
person-to-person network, however, cyber-directed vacci-
nation strategies do not significantly outperform the RI
strategy. This effect is more pronounced in the small target
group size regime (less than 20% of the population).
Figure 2b reveals an inherent difference between the fraction
of immunized individuals needed to reach the same reduction
of outbreak size in the short- and full-range networks, respect-
ively. The effect of vaccination is generallyweaker in the highly
connected full-range network. Insets show themode of the dis-
tributions over all realizations, indicating a clear separation of
the strategies, and a higher efficacy of cyber-directed vacci-
nation in the case of short-range interactions. At low levels of
immunization fv, 0.1 (where fv denotes the vaccinated frac-
tion of the population) (subplots (i) and (iv) in figure 2b), the
effect of vaccination is low, due to the high density of edges
in both person-to-person proximity networks. At high levels
of immunization (figure 2b subplots (iii) and (vi)), with more
than half of the population vaccinated, the digital communi-
cation network target groups contain the majority of socially
active individuals, resulting in the cyber-directed vaccination
strategy approximating the optimal CS also for full-range
transmission. In the intermediate range 0.1, fv, 0.5 (subplots
(ii) and (v) in figure 2b), cyber-directed vaccination is signifi-
cantly more effective than random vaccination and
approaches the efficiency of the optimal strategy in the case
of short-range transmission. The intuitive reason behind this
difference between the short- and full-range networks is that
the structure of the full-range proximity network is strongly
influenced by many random encounters, not captured by the
corresponding (but presumably intentional) digital networks
(see electronic supplementary material, §S4.1 for an elaborated
analysis of vaccination in the proximity networks). The obser-
vations above are further supported by a Mann–Whitney test
calculated over the distribution of relative outbreak sizes for
different strategies. The tests show a significantly higher simi-
larity between cyber-directed and optimal strategies in the case
of short-range interactions (see electronic supplementary
material for details).
The performance of cyber-directed vaccination is robust
with respect to different centralities used for selection of the
target groups (degree, k-coreness, betweenness) and variation
in how communication channels are constructed (using calls
and text messages). In electronic supplementary material,
§S4.1, we investigate the robustness of the results in detail
with respect to different strategies.
Regardless of the target selection strategy, implementing
targeted vaccination assumes network stability (i.e. that targets
identified before an outbreak takes place remain critical to
disease propagation during the vaccination phase). To analyse
the trade-off between performance of targeted intervention
and the time gap between identification and intervention, we
fixed the period that forms the basis of our target individual
selection (February, index month) and calculated monitoring
and immunization performance for outbreaks in subsequent
months (March, April and May, outbreak months), as shown in
figure 3.We compared the performance of cyber-directed strat-
egies based on the index month to RI and two types of CS:
colocation based on proximity data in the index month and
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groups show significantly lower infection time relative to
random monitoring in these subsequent months, although
target groups based on the index month do not perform as
well as the optimal groups calculated in the outbreak months
(figure 3a) due to the small changes in the social structure of
the population. Immunizing members of the index month,
target groups outperform random vaccination in all three out-
break months, as seen in figure 3b. We start by estimating CS
target groups based on February data. Now, we consider the
fraction of vaccinated individuals needed to achieve an 80%
decrease in the number of infected, relative to the outbreak
size in the unvaccinated scenarios in subsequent months. We
find that for both March and April, we require 17% immuniz-
ation, versus 56% in May. Analogously, strategies based on
the cyber networks, which use information only from the
index month of February, require immunization levels of 30%,
35% and 56% forMarch, April andMay, respectively, to achieve
the same 80% decrease. The high overlap between the error
bands (lower and upper quartiles) between optimal and
cyber-directed vaccination, indicate the statistical similarity of
the two strategies in March. As the index month’s contact pat-
terns become more and more outdated and less informative
of the actual month of the simulation (April and May), cyber-directed vaccination curves separate less from the random vac-
cination, underscoring the decreasing predictive power of data
from February.4. Discussion
If the goal of an optimized targeted vaccination strategy is to
disrupt forward transmission of disease, then immunizing
individuals with the greatest likelihood of infecting the largest
number of their network neighbours is critical. Specifically, a
good candidate for immunization (when focusing on a single
age group) should be highly exposed to the disease and simul-
taneously exhibit high potential to transmit the infection. Using
data from multiple layers of social interactions captured in the
CNStudy,we show that the digital communication (cyber) net-
works can be used to predict which individuals are central to
epidemic spread based on close person-to-person proximity,
yielding prime candidates for outbreak-limiting immuniz-
ation. The performance of targeted vaccination based on
cyber network structure, however, is strongly affected by the
nature of pathogen transmission, displaying high efficacy in
the case of short-range transmission, but less utility when an
infection spreads via full-range contacts. Practically, this
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to droplet spreading) can be effectively contained by network-
directed targeted vaccination, whereas in the case of full-range
transmissions (closer to airborne diseases), targeting individ-
uals using communication networks will perform more
poorly in containing an outbreak.
This result arises from the inherent structure of short-range
physical contacts: close contacts in the person-to-person
network frequently correspond to social ties and therefore
communication networks contain more relevant information
about the structure of the short-range network. Assuming
that the online/offline behaviour observed in this student
population is representative of the full population, our findings
suggest that, when considering real-world diseases, online
social networks and CDR data can serve as a valuable resource
for epidemic intervention. Regarding one of the most basic
differences between the above transmission types (their
physical range of infection), public health officials trying to
implement innovative immunization strategies may benefit
from cyber network data in the case of droplet diseases, but
not during airborne infections, as we expect real-world air-
borne transmission networks to have even more connections
between socially unconnected individuals than the full-range
network examined here due to the characteristics of airborne
diseases (the ability to suspend in rooms, transmission via
contact with inanimate surfaces, etc.).
The communication and social networks analysed in
this study have varying degrees of resilience in the face of
disruption (a detailed analysis of the network characteris-
tics affecting monitoring and vaccination can be found in
electronic supplementary material, §S3.2 and S4.2). When
removing the fedge fraction of the links randomly from the net-
work, we found that physical proximity networks break down
at a density close to that of the random networks, whereas
digital communications become disconnected when a smaller
fraction of links are removed. These findings are consistent
with previous work: proximity networks are structurally
homogeneous with a well-defined average degree, while com-
munication networks are characterized by heterogeneous
degree distributions [10,12,18,24,35]. Thus it is critical to reiter-
ate that physical proximity networks which approximate the
actual paths supporting the spreading of infectious diseases
and communication networks are fundamentally different
both in a structural and dynamical sense, e.g. how infectious
diseases spread through these networks. Fortunately, it does
not follow that strategies gleaned from examining communi-
cation networks are incapable of informing real-world
practice; on the contrary, we find that control strategies based
on cyber networks are robust with respect to temporal
changes—that is, that target groups can be identified months
before an outbreak and still provide a significant improvement
over interventions based on randomly selected groups, pro-
vided that a disease spreads via short-range transmission
(see electronic supplementary material, §S5 for more detail).4.1. Limitations
It is important to acknowledge that our model of epidemic
processes on person-to-person proximity networks is a major
simplification of the underlying biological processes, and yet
it serves our aim in this paper. The detailed transmission of
droplet and airborne diseases is not fully captured by recipro-
cal Bluetooth measurements, e.g. transmission of biologicalpathogens is not merely characterized by distance but is also
affected by many other environmental characteristics and indi-
vidual behaviour. Droplet transmission requires individuals to
face each other in close proximity [27,36], while airborne patho-
gens can stay suspended in the air or settle on surfaces,
significantly increasing the opportunity for infection [36].
However, these characteristics amplify the differences between
person-to-person networks by effectively removing superflu-
ous links from the short-range network and adding
additional noise to the full-range network. Thus, the efficacy
of using digital communication channels in targeted monitor-
ing and vaccination can be expected to be even higher for a
true droplet network and closer to random for airborne
transmission.
Our study is carried out in a student population. These
individuals may have different contact patterns than the
general population, including older adults or children [18].
In particular, the student population is likely to be the one
for which the communication networks most reflect the
characteristics of real face-to-face networks, potentially in
terms of connected individuals and in terms of time lag
between the digital connection and real face-to-face contacts
[37]. In this sense, we acknowledge that the participants in
the study are not necessarily representative of ‘the public’;
they represent a single specific population, a fact known to
result in an underestimation of epidemic risk [38]. Neverthe-
less, it should be noted that our results rely solely on the
comparisons within this same population, and the structural
differences are restricted to that of connectivity. Although it is
well known that vital dynamics and ageing (that are not
included in our model) have a strong impact on the spread-
ing process [39], in the cohort that forms the basis of the
current study, individuals are members of the same age
class and therefore we can neglect these effects. Finally, Blue-
tooth signals are able to pass through walls, which introduces
non-physical contacts and unrealistic spreading events in the
dataset; however, the fraction of links that can be potentially
associated with these cases is, we believe, negligible.4.2. Conclusion
In this paper, we have taken a first step towards investigating
how knowledge of the cyber network structure of a popu-
lation (in this case consisting of telecommunication and
social interaction platforms) can be used to identify target
groups for efficient targeted vaccination. Our most notable
finding is that, in our modelling framework, relatively
subtle differences in the structure of disease transmission
mechanisms, formulated here as a dichotomous choice
between droplet-like and airborne routes, may have a pro-
found impact on final epidemic size when using cyber
networks as a basis for targeted vaccination. The corollary
of this is that for diseases with short-range transmission
modes, we find that using cyber-based targeting strategies
can dramatically decrease final outbreak size even when vac-
cine coverage in the targeted population is realistically low
(around 20%). As digital communication data of the types
modelled here may allow for early detection and containment
of infectious outbreaks in densely connected populations (i.e.,
in schools, universities, workplaces and neighbourhoods),
our work also supports increased collaboration between prac-
titioners in public health and operators of social networks
and telecommunication companies.
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